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A striking feature of many financial crises is the collapse of exports relative to output. In the 2008
financial crisis, real world exports plunged 17 percent while GDP fell 5 percent. This paper examines
whether deteriorations in bank health can help explain the large drops in exports relative to output
in the recent crisis. Our paper is the first to establish a causal link between the health of banks providing
trade finance and growth in a firm’s exports relative to its domestic sales. We overcome measurement
and endogeneity issues by using a unique data set, covering the Japanese financial crises from 1990
through 2010, which enables us to match exporters with the main bank that provides them with trade
finance. Our point estimates are economically and statistically significant, suggesting that the health
of financial institutions is an important determinant of firm-level exports during crises.
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1.  Introduction 
  One of the most striking features of the financial crisis of 2008 was the collapse in 
international trade. Figure 1 plots the ratio of real world exports to real gross domestic product 
for a sample of the largest economies in the world.
1 As this plot shows, the decline in world 
exports was much greater than the decline in world GDP. Between the first quarter of 2008 and 
the first quarter of 2009, the real value of GDP fell 4.6 percent while exports plunged 17 percent, 
which amounts to a decline of $761 billion in nominal terms.  
This trade collapse has prompted a number of researchers to postulate that trade finance 
may be partially responsible for the decline (see Auboin (2009), Bricogne et al (2009), Campbell 
et al (2009), Chor and Manova (2010), Haddad et al (2010), and OECD (2009)). While Eaton et 
al (2010) argue that demand shocks can explain 80 percent of the aggregate decline, these 
authors find that for China and Japan, which account for 15 percent of world exports, demand 
shocks only explained 8 to 23 percent of the spectacular declines in their export to GDP ratios. 
Our paper assesses the importance of trade finance by being the first to match exporters with the 
institutions that provide them with finance and thereby establish a causal link between the health 
of these banks and the output and export growth of their clients. Indeed, we are the first paper to 
show a link between the exports of firms and the health of institutions that provide them with 
finance. Importantly, we also demonstrate that the health of banks providing finance has a much 
larger effect on exports than on domestic sales, thus establishing that financial shocks affect 
exports and domestic sales differently.  
                                                 
1 We used the set of countries that report quarterly seasonally adjusted export and GDP data from national sources. 
These countries are Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Hong Kong, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Jointly, they accounted for 66 
percent of world GDP and 68 percent of world exports in 2008. 2 
 
In order to understand how financial shocks get transmitted to exporters, Japan is a 
particularly interesting case to study because the collapse of Lehman had an immediate impact 
on several Japanese banks. For instance, Aozora and Mizuho were two of the five largest 
unsecured creditors to Lehman and had a combined exposure of close to $1 billion according to 
the Lehman bankruptcy filing (US Bankruptcy Court (2008)). Japan is also unique in providing 
detailed data that enables us to match banks with firms so that we can trace how financial shocks 
are transmitted to the real sector not just in the current crisis but also in the past Japanese 
financial crises of the 1990s. Moreover, since the collapse in real estate prices in the early 1990s 
was not accompanied by a global demand shock, we can also estimate our model over time 
periods where we can be certain that global demand shocks were not a major concern for 
Japanese exporters. 
Proponents of a trade finance channel between banks and exporters note that exports are 
more sensitive to financial shocks due to the higher default risk and higher working capital 
requirements associated with international trade. The need to insure against credit default risk 
arises because exporters rarely have the capacity or willingness to evaluate default risk and 
usually turn to banks to provide payment insurance and guarantees. In addition, exporters need 
more working-capital financing than firms engaged in domestic transactions because of the 
longer time lags associated with international trade, especially when shipping by sea. Our results 
provide support for these channels by showing that declines in bank health have no impact on the 
exports of firms with foreign affiliates (where default risk is not an issue) or on the exports of 
firms in industries that ship principally by air (where the transit times and therefore working 
capital needs are not much different than for domestic sales). 3 
 
The need for exporters to hedge against credit default risk and obtain working capital 
financing has resulted in a system in which virtually every exporter works with a bank or other 
financial institution to obtain credit or export guarantees.
2 We will henceforth refer to this nexus 
of financial arrangements as trade finance – that is, the use of financial intermediaries to manage 
an exporter’s trade credit default risk and terms.
 The fact that exporters depend so heavily on 
financial institutions for working capital and risk insurance suggests that if a credit crunch causes 
banks to limit trade finance, exports are likely to be affected more than domestic sales. Indeed, 
our results show that a decline in bank health hits firms’ exports 7 times harder than their 
domestic sales. 
Our basic empirical strategy is to exploit the fact that some firms within an industry in a 
particular year relied on relatively healthy banks for trade finance, while others relied on less 
healthy institutions. We use this within-industry-year variation to identify how a firm’s export 
growth changed with the health of the banks supplying it with trade finance. The use of industry-
time fixed effects sweeps out all macro and industry supply-and-demand shocks that are 
common to all exporters in an industry at a moment in time to ensure that our identification is 
based on how banks whose health deteriorates affect their export clients within a narrowly 
defined industry at a moment in time.  
  Our paper builds on and contributes to a number of literatures. The notion that financial 
shocks and capital constraints matter for loan supply and investment has been well established. 
In seminal work, Peek and Rosengren (1997, 2000, and 2005) were able to document that when 
Japanese banks became unhealthy in the 1990s, they lent less in the US and that this decline 
resulted in lower construction activity in states that were heavily dependent on Japanese banks. 
Similarly, Khwaja and Mian (2008) have provided convincing evidence in Pakistan that 
                                                 
2 For example, Feenstra et al (2010) show that Chinese exporters are more credit constrained than non-exporters.  4 
 
deteriorations in bank health or increases in the cost of raising capital cause banks to contract 
lending. Similarly, Klein, Peek, and Rosengren (2002) demonstrate that the number of foreign 
direct investment flows are sensitive to the financial health of the banks supplying the firm with 
credit. Attempts to link bank health to the real economy have relied on aggregate data that makes 
it difficult to know whether the firms borrowing from the troubled institutions were the ones 
affected. For example, Ashcraft (2005) examined how the failure of healthy bank subsidiaries 
affected county level output in Texas and finds a significant link. Similarly, Richardson and 
Troost (2009) provide convincing evidence that banks experienced serious liquidity constraints 
during the great depression and that the provision of additional liquidity led to higher lending 
levels. However, none of these papers examine the link between the output levels of borrowers 
and the health of the lenders.  
A number of authors in the international finance literature have examined the possibility 
that trade credit or the availability of dollar-denominated short-term credit might affect exports 
(see Ronci (2005); Berman and Martin (2009); Iacovone and Zavacka (2009). While some of 
these studies have found positive associations, others have found no association, or even 
negative associations. The failure to obtain consistent results is probably partially due to 
measurement issues. The first measurement issue stems from the fact that firms may obtain 
dollar-denominated short-term financing for reasons other than financing trade and not all trade 
is financed by dollar denominated short-term credit. Moreover, firm financing decisions are 
likely affected by expectations of changes in cash flow, and cash flows are positively correlated 
with exports. Finally, and most seriously, is the deeper problem arising from the fact that trade 
finance can cause trade credit to rise or fall.
3  
                                                 
3 Although trade credit and trade finance are sometimes used interchangeably, the terms can be confusing because 
trade credit has a clear definition in accounting and a looser one in finance. In particular, whenever a firm receives 5 
 
We can see the impacts of trade finance on trade credit by considering the most common 
form of trade finance: the letter of credit. Since a letter of credit stipulates that a bank, and not 
the exporter, bears the importer’s default risk, making letters of credit more accessible would 
reduce the transaction risk for exporters. The resulting reduction in risk would make exporters 
more willing to accept orders and therefore accept trade credits on their balance sheets. This 
channel provides a mechanism through which an increase in the supply of letters of credit could 
serve to increase the amount of trade credit. However, letters of credit also typically contain an 
export working-capital loan that specifies that the exporter will be paid when the goods are 
shipped as opposed to the usual 30 to 90 days after the goods arrive. The fact that letters of credit 
result in exporters getting paid earlier means that exporters can remove trade credits from the 
accounts receivable portion of their balance sheets faster thereby reducing the stock of trade 
credit.
4 Thus, even if one believes that trade finance is important, it is not clear whether one 
should expect increased availability of trade finance to increase or decrease trade credit.  
As a result of the complexities involved in measuring fluctuations in the availability of 
trade finance, much of the international trade literature has followed Kletzer and Bardhan (1987), 
who have examined how long-term access to external finance affects comparative advantage.
 
This work does not focus on high-frequency shocks to the supply of trade finance per se but 
rather on the more general supply of external finance to firms. Chaney (2005) develops a model 
                                                                                                                                                           
an order for goods or services that will be paid later, it records a “trade credit” on the accounts receivable section of 
its balance sheet. This is true regardless of whether the purchaser is foreign or domestic, so that firms with a lot of 
trade credit on their books may not do any international trade. In finance, trade credit is also sometimes used to 
refer to working-capital loans used to finance international trade credits on the balance sheets of exporters. In order 
to avoid confusing these two senses of trade credit, we will always refer to trade credit in the accounting sense and 
refer to export working-capital loans and other means of financing these trade credits as trade finance. 
4 Similarly, “export factoring” (selling a discounted bill, corresponding to the export account receivable to a 
financial institution) and “forfaiting” (selling medium- to long-term receivables to a financial institution at a 
discount) are other major forms of trade finance that also have ambiguous effects on trade credit, depending on 
whether the insurance or the working-capital loan effects dominate. These forces are further complicated by the fact 
that risk premiums and borrowing costs may vary widely across countries, time, and industries, making it very 
difficult to assess whether firms with higher or lower levels of trade credit on their balance sheet have better or 
worse access to trade finance. 6 
 
in which firms are liquidity constrained and must pay a fixed cost in order to export. As a result, 
there will be suboptimal entry into the export market. Manova (2008) provides compelling 
evidence that capital market liberalizations enable export sectors with needs for greater external 
capital to expand over the long run. Both papers are important in understanding why financing 
might matter for exporters who require external capital funds to cover fixed costs or other long-
term needs, but neither paper addresses the impact of financial shocks on firms that are already 
engaged in exporting. More recently, Bricogne et al. (2009) use industry measures of external 
credit dependence to show that French exporters in sectors that were more dependent on external 
finance tended to contract more in the current crisis than those that were less dependent on 
external finance. This work is suggestive of a possible link between financial shocks and trade 
but leaves open the questions of whether external credit usage is endogenous, whether there was 
a distinct trade finance channel, and indeed whether the exports of these firms behaved 
differently from their domestic sales, the question at the center of our work.  
The structure of the remainder of the paper is as follows: In section 2, we discuss why 
exporters use trade finance. Section 3 describes how the supply of trade finance can affect 
exporters. Section 4 discusses some basic facts about the Japanese financial crises. Section 5 
describes our data. Section 6 then presents the Japanese firm-level evidence. Section 7 provides 
robustness checks. Section 8 discusses the economic significance of our results and section 9 
concludes. 
 
2.  Why Might Trade Finance Matter? 
  Trade finance encompasses a series of payment methods for exporters and importers that 
govern the timing and security of payments. While trade finance has received scant attention in 7 
 
the academic literature, textbooks on international finance management describe it as “the 
fundamental problem in international trade” (e.g. Bekaert and Hodrick (2008)). As Bekaert and 
Hodrick (2008) explain: 
Shipping goods across a country as large as the United States poses many 
complex logistical and financial problems. Shipping goods across international 
borders creates a host of additional complications… Either the exporter or the 
importer must engage in some method of financing because the goods cannot be 
sold immediately after production. When the shipment and sale of goods occur 
within a single country, there is a common jurisdiction and system of courts that 
adjudicates contractual disputes between buyers and sellers. When goods are 
shipped across borders, though, additional legal complexities arise. One such 
complexity relates to collecting on delinquent accounts…. p. 650. 
 
The letter of credit is the oldest and simplest means of dealing with exporters’ special 
working capital and default insurance needs. Letters of Credit make up about 40 percent of all 
trade finance contracts (IMF-BAFT 2009). The letter of credit breaks the payment cycle into a 
number of stages and substitutes a financial institution’s default risk for the importer’s default 
risk. In the first stage of the process, the importer and exporter negotiate a sales contract that 
specifies all of the key parameters of the transaction – e.g. price, quantity, delivery terms, 
payment terms etc. The terms of the sales contract often require the importer to ask its “issuing 
bank” to issue a letter of credit guaranteeing payment for the imports upon certification that the 
exporter has met the terms of the contract. Second, using the letter of credit as collateral, the 
exporter will often obtain a working capital loan from its bank (often called the advising bank) to 
cover the production costs of the goods.  
  The third step in the process involves the transfer of the goods to the carrier and the title 
of the goods to importer’s issuing bank. Assuming all of the documents are in order, the issuing 
bank will issue a “banker’s acceptance” to the exporter guaranteeing payment at a future time, 8 
 
often around 90 days after the goods arrive.
5 The exporter typically will then sell the banker’s 
acceptance to its advising bank at a discount based on the interest rate charged by the bank. This 
enables the exporter to be paid upon shipping the goods and also provides the funds to the 
exporter to repay the working capital loan from its bank, and removes the trade credit from the 
exporter’s balance sheet. The advising bank will then record a “foreign bills bought” on its 
balance sheet.
6 After the goods arrive, the title of the goods is transferred to the importer from 
the issuing bank in exchange for either immediate payment or more frequently a promissory note 
stating that the importer will pay the issuing bank (with interest) at the same time that the 
banker’s acceptance matures. 
Banks need to raise funds from external markets at various times during this cycle. For 
example, the advising bank needs to raise funds to cover the working capital loan whose only 
collateral is the letter of credit and the exporter’s ability to successfully produce and ship the 
goods. After the goods ship and the advising bank is repaid on the working capital loan, the bank 
also needs to raise money to cover the cost of payment to the exporter using the banker’s 
acceptance as collateral. Very often it accomplishes this by selling the issuing bank’s “banker’s 
acceptance” to other investors.  
Payment defaults can occur at any point in this cycle. The importer can default on its 
payment to the issuing bank, the issuing bank can default on the terms of the letter of credit, the 
advising bank can refuse to extend a working capital loan or refuse to purchase the banker’s 
acceptance, or the exporter can default on the initial working capital loan. Because of data 
availability, our paper focuses on the third type of problem, i.e. the exporter’s bank refusing to 
extend working capital loans or purchase bankers’ acceptances.  
                                                 
5 According to a joint International Monetary Fund–Bankers’ Association of Finance and Trade survey, in the fourth 
quarter of 2007 only 19 percent of all international trade transactions were done on a cash-in-advance basis. 
6 In US accounting, the bank will record a “banker’s acceptance.” 9 
 
As Bekaert and Hodrick (2008) argue, one reason why exporters use trade finance is that 
international trade takes significantly more time to execute than domestic trade. Djankov, Freund, 
and Pham (2006) found in a sample of 180 countries that the median amount of time it takes 
from the moment the goods are ready to ship from the factory until the goods are loaded on a 
ship is 21 days. Much of this time is spent dealing with the paperwork and procedures associated 
with getting goods ready to ship internationally. Similarly, the median amount of time it takes 
from the moment a typical good arrives in a port until the good arrives in the purchaser’s 
warehouse is 23 days. If we couple this finding with Hummels’s (2001) estimate that the typical 
good imported into the US by sea spends 20 days on a vessel, we can see that it is not uncommon 
for goods to spend approximately two months in transit. Even in OECD countries, which have 
the most streamlined procedures, it takes 11 days for a good to reach a port or arrive from a port. 
These data suggest that firms engaged in international trade are likely to be more reliant than 
domestic firms on working-capital financing to cover the costs of goods that have been produced 
but not yet delivered. 
Indeed, the available data suggest that trade finance is extremely important and 
commonplace as a means of reducing counterparty risk and of securing working-capital funds. 
Although measurement problems have caused many countries to stop collecting trade finance 
data, the best evidence, which is based on the 2004 Joint BIS-IMF-OECD-World Bank Statistics 
on External Debt, suggests that 90 percent of trade transactions involve some form of credit, 
insurance, or guarantee issued by a bank or other financial institution (Auboin (2007)). It is 
therefore not surprising that in the Lehman bankruptcy six of the thirty largest unsecured claims 
against Lehman were letters of credit (US Bankruptcy Court (2008)). Indeed, given that about 80 10 
 
percent of the providers of trade finance are private banks (Auboin 2009), there are many 
channels through which the troubles of banks can affect trade flows.
7  
 
3.  The Trade Finance Transmission Channel 
  Given that banks are the principal suppliers of trade finance, the supply of such financing 
is likely to be closely tied to the health of the banks. In particular, as the health of banks 
deteriorates, these financial institutions find it increasingly difficult to raise funds either through 
interbank borrowing or through the issuance of new bonds or equity. And as these sources of 
liquidity diminish, unhealthy institutions cut back on their lending. These cutbacks are likely to 
have a particularly large impact on trade finance because the short maturities of trade finance and 
its need for constant renewal make it particularly sensitive to a bank’s ability to extend new 
credit. Moreover, since exports are much more dependent on finance than domestic sales for the 
reasons outlined above, exports are likely to be harder hit by financial shocks. This suggests the 
existence of a “financial accelerator” for exports akin to that described in Bernanke, Gertler, and 
Gilchrist (1999) because the initial shocks to the macro economy, in this case in the real estate 
sector, are amplified and passed on to the rest of the economy through the financial market.  
The discussion so far suggests that financial shocks are likely to be transmitted to 
exporters through two channels. First, financial institutions that have difficulty raising new funds 
may increase their rates for trade finance. In the Japanese financial crises of the 1990s this could 
be seen in the jump in interbank borrowing rates charged to Japanese banks relative to foreign 
                                                 
7 Financial innovation played a big role in non-banks like AIG moving into the trade finance arena by writing export 
credit default insurance to replace the insurance supplied by the issuing banks. These credit default guarantees 
enable the exporter to sell its trade credits to other financial institutions. This helps explain why export credit 
insurance is such an enormous business. For example, according to the Berne Union, the leading association of 
export credit insurance providers, its members had an export credit default insurance exposure of $1.4 trillion in 
2008 (Source, http://www.berneunion.org.uk/bu-total-data.html).  11 
 
institutions (the so-called “Japan Premium”). Similarly, in the 2008 crisis, the standard measure 
of the risk premium charged to banks (the difference between interbank offer rates charged to 
banks and the overnight indexed swap rate (OIS)) jumped sharply reflecting higher bank 
borrowing costs.   
Second, liquidity may dry up and banks may simply be unable to borrow and extend 
sufficient credit. For example the Bank of Japan (1998) noted that in the midst of the 1998 crisis, 
“lending attitudes of financial institutions, however, are becoming increasingly cautious as 
capital adequacy constraints have become more binding.”  While we don’t know how much of 
the deterioration in bank capital resulted in higher premiums charged for trade finance in Japan 
in 1998, there is clear evidence that this happened in the more recent 2008 crisis. An IMF-BAFT 
Survey (2009) of 88 banks in 44 countries revealed that the average spreads on letters of credit, 
export credit insurance, and short- to medium-term trade-related lending rose by 70, 107, and 99 
basis points respectively in the second quarter of 2009 relative to the fourth quarter of 2007. 
Probably part of this reflected greater trade finance default rates during the crisis. Jones (2010) 
reports that the loss ratio for trade credit insurance (i.e. the ratio of claims to gross premiums 
paid in) doubled from their historic levels in 2008 so that the average insurer was paying out 85 
cents in default insurance for every dollar entering the firm. These 100 basis point jumps in the 
trade finance spreads are particularly striking given that the typical spread on a letter of credit is 
10–16 basis points (see Auboin (2009)). The IMF survey also revealed that 57 percent of banks 
believed that part of the decline in trade finance transactions was caused by a tightening of credit 
availability at their own institution.  The deteriorations in the financial health (or outright 
bankruptcy) of major players in the trade finance world like Lehman, AIG, CIT Group, Citigroup, 
Bank of America, and Wells Fargo may have made it difficult for these banks to raise money to 12 
 
finance their export clients’ trade credit default risk. The simultaneous collapse in the 
commercial paper market may have left exporters with few options other than cutting exports if 
their trade finance providers ran into trouble.  
  In sum, our discussion of trade finance suggests a potentially important link between 
exports and the financial sector. Because of the higher risk and working-capital needs of 
exporting, firms rely more on banks for their exports than for their domestic sales. As a 
consequence, financial crises are likely to affect exports more negatively than domestic sales. In 
order to examine this relationship, we first present an overview of the Japanese financial crises  
and then turn to the firm-level evidence to identify the connection between exports and the 
financial market.  
 
4.  The Japanese Financial Crises 
  There are a number of reasons why Japan provides an ideal case for examining the 
impact of financial crises on exports. First, as the fourth largest exporter in the world, what 
happens in Japan has a large impact on the global economy. Second, the frequency of financial 
crises in Japan over the last twenty years provides us with several events to study.
8 Although not 
global in scope, the major driving forces behind the crises in the earlier periods were also real 
estate and stock market bubbles. In Japan, stock prices peaked in December 1989, and real estate 
prices in Tokyo peaked in the same year. Japanese bank stock prices fell sharply in late 1991 and 
early 1992 as it was determined that commercial banks would end up absorbing a 
disproportionate share of the losses suffered by the specialized mortgage lending companies that 
some of these banks had founded.  By 1995, Japanese stock prices had fallen 49 percent from 
                                                 
8 The details of Japan’s financial crises have been extensively examined elsewhere (see Hoshi and Kashyap (2001) 
for an excellent discussion), so we will highlight only a few of the relevant details here. 13 
 
their peak, and commercial and residential real estate prices in the six largest cities of Japan had 
fallen 60 and 44 percent, respectively. This drop had heterogeneous effects on financial 
institutions: Japanese banks that had lent heavily in the real estate sectors – the Long-Term 
Credit Bank (LTCB) and Nippon Credit Bank, for example – were particularly hard hit by a 
sudden rise in nonperforming real estate loans coupled with big losses in their equity portfolios. 
Similarly, banks with long-term liabilities suffered heavy losses as Japanese interest rates fell.  
  Initially, the disclosure of nonperforming loans and other losses was highly imperfect, but 
bank analysts soon began to realize that many Japanese financial institutions were insolvent. This 
information became much more public with the emergence of the “Japan premium” in the mid-
1990s, which reflected the unwillingness of investors to extend short-term credit to Japanese 
banks unless the banks paid a substantial risk premium. Hoshi and Kashyap (2001) succinctly 
describe what happened next: 
Slowing growth in 1997 uncovered more bad loans, and in November 1997 a 
crisis erupted. On 3 November, Sanyo Securities, a mid-sized securities firm 
famous for having the world’s largest trading floor during the speculative frenzy 
of the late 1980s, suspended part of its operations and filed for bankruptcy 
protection. This was the first postwar default in the overnight interbank loan 
market, a shocking event. Then Hokkaido Takushoku Bank…was no longer able 
to secure funding in the interbank market. It was forced to close on 17 November, 
marking the first failure of a major bank in postwar Japan. A week later, on 24 
November, Yamaichi Securities, one of the Big Four security houses, collapsed 
following rumors (which subsequently proved true) that it had suffered huge 
losses. (p. 276)  
 
Interbank overnight loan rates in Japan skyrocketed, with the Japan premium hitting 100 
basis points, as Japan’s short-term credit markets seized up. These events closely mirrored the 
collapse in interbank liquidity markets in the US in late 2008. As Peek and Rosengren (2000, 
2005) convincingly document, in the massive credit crunch that followed Japanese banks were 14 
 
reluctant to provide new loans. With $50 billion in bad loans, the LTCB, the ninth-largest bank 
in the world, had to be nationalized by the end of 1998 (Tett (2004) p. xi).  
As the discussion has made clear, there are important similarities between Japan in the 
1990s and the crisis of 2008. Both crises were initially caused by collapses in real estate prices 
that caused bad loans to spread from specialized mortgage lenders to banks and other financial 
institutions. In both, the proximate cause of the crises came from defaults in markets used by 
banks to secure short-term funds:  Sanyo’s default in the Tokyo interbank market in Japan and, 
more recently, Lehman’s default in the money market. And, as we will document next, there was 
a dramatic decline in Japanese exports after each financial crisis.  
 
5.  Banks and Exporters: Data 
Our sample of firms is drawn from two sources: the Development Bank of Japan (DBJ) 
database of unconsolidated corporate reports for early years and Nikkei NEEDS FinancialQuest 
for later years. Between 1986 and 1999, the DBJ collected data on exports and loans for every 
firm listed on a stock exchange. Similarly, Nikkei reports exports on a consolidated basis 
consistently from 2003 onwards. The unconsolidated data is richer, so we will only use the 
earlier data in some of the robustness checks.  One other complication is that the merger wave 
that hit Japanese banking in the aftermath of the banking crisis in 1998 and the legalization of 
bank holding companies makes it very hard to match banks and firms between 2000 and 2006 
because every bank in our sample underwent at least one merger or restructuring and many of 
them had several such events. Thus, we cannot sensibly match banks and firms during this period, 
and so we restart our sample in 2007.  15 
 
The manufacturing exporters in our sample (ranging between 540 and 860 firms 
depending on the year), on average, accounted for 80 percent of all Japanese merchandise 
exports over this time period. In general, the Japanese fiscal year runs from April in year t until 
March in year t+1, with the accounting year of 86 percent of firms ending in March and 9 
percent of firms ending in November or December. Figure 2 shows how well changes in exports 
of our sample of firms track those of the overall economy. In this figure, we plot the aggregate 
export data on a fiscal year basis from the Ministry of Finance, which is on an April–March basis, 
with the aggregate export data in our sample of firms. As the figure shows, aggregate export 
growth computed from our sample of firms follows Japanese exports from official sources quite 
closely. This suggests that our data are likely to capture any aggregate movements in Japanese 
exports.  
In order to identify which financial institutions are providing these firms with trade 
finance, we supplement the DBJ and Nikkei data with data obtained from the Japan Company 
Handbook, which provides information on each firm’s transactional banks or “reference banks.” 
These banks, listed in order of importance, handle most of the firm’s transactions. In cases where 
a firm’s main reference bank was a regional bank, and therefore probably not active 
internationally, we identified the bank most likely to provide trade finance as the first large 
commercial bank on the list of reference banks.
9 Although listed Japanese firms often deal with 
multiple banks, it is generally agreed that the main bank identified in this manner is the bank that 
                                                 
9 We defined the set of internationally active banks as Japan’s “city banks” plus a few other prominent banks, giving 
us a sample of 15 banks: Asahi Bank, Bank of Tokyo, Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi, The Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, The 
Daiwa Bank,The Fuji Bank, Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, Industrial Bank of Japan, Long Term Credit Bank of Japan, 
Saitama Bank, Sakura Bank, The Sanwa Bank, Sumitomo Bank, Taiyo-Kobe Bank, and The Tokai Bank. During 
our sample period, some banks merged and others were nationalized: Taiyo-Kobe merged with Sakura Bank in 
1990; Saitama Bank merged with Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank in 1992; The Bank of Tokyo merged with the Bank of 
Tokyo-Mitsubishi in 1996; The Long Term Credit Bank of Japan was nationalized in 1998; and Hokkaido 
Takushoku Bank failed in 1998. Thus, we start with 15 banks in 1987, but this number falls to 11 banks by 1999. In 
the later period we focus on Mizuho Financial Group, MUFJ Financial Group, Sumitomo-Mitsui Financial Group, 
Resona Holdings, and Shinsei.   16 
 
typically handles the firm’s payment settlement accounts and foreign exchange dealings (see 
Aoki, Patrick, and Sheard (1994)). Nevertheless, we examine alternative ways of identifying the 
main bank in the robustness section. 
Our next task is to measure the health of banks. The major problem we face is that during 
the 1990s Japanese banks employed a wide variety of techniques to hide losses on their balance 
sheets. As a result, Peek and Rosengren (2005) argue that stock returns are much better measures 
of bank health than standard capital adequacy ratios, and we follow their suggested 
methodology.
10 For each main bank, we computed the monthly market-to-book value as the 
average monthly share price multiplied by the number of shares outstanding and divided by the 
book value of its equity.
11 We define the log change in the market-to-book value as the 12-month 
log difference of this number. All these data were taken from the Pacific Basin Capital Markets 
database for the early years and from Nikkei in the later years. Finally, we were able to obtain 
data on “foreign bills bought,” which is a measure of the trade finance extended by each bank 
from Nikkei.  
Ultimately, we will examine whether changes in a bank’s market-to-book value affect its 
client’s future export performance. For that purpose, it is useful to define the lagged change in 
bank health as the lagged log change in the bank’s market-to-book value over the 12-month 
period before the close of the company’s books. This approach lets us examine whether a 
                                                 
10 Peek and Rosengren (2005) argue that “it is widely believed that Japanese bank capital ratios are substantially 
overstated…. For example, Bank of Japan Governor Masaru Hayami told Parliament that the capital ratios of 
Japanese banks in March 2001 would have been only 7 percent rather than the reported 11 percent had they been 
held to the U.S. standards of capital adequacy. An even lower, and likely more prudent, estimate of the state of 
capitalization of Japanese banks is that the reported 10-percent capital ratios of the big banks represent a capital ratio 
of only about 2 percent once the public funds injected into the banks, the value of deferred taxes, and the ‘profits’ 
from the revaluation of real estate holdings are subtracted from the banks’ capital…. To the extent that analysts are 
able to penetrate the veil of reported capital and nonperforming loan ratios, widely viewed as deviating 
substantially from the true extent of bank problems, stock returns should reflect the best estimates of bank health 
[emphasis added].” 
11 Generally, book values do not move much except in one instance where Resona Holdings had an enormous 
increase in its book value in 2009 that was not achieved through the issuance of equity and had no impact on its 
market value, so we dropped Resona in 2009 and 2010. 17 
 
collapse in the market value of a bank in one year is associated with slower export growth in a 
subsequent fiscal year. For example, if a firm’s fiscal year ends in March, we would examine 
whether the change in the market-to-book value of its main bank between March of 1997 and 
March of 1998 was associated with slower growth in exports from fiscal year 1998 to fiscal year 
1999.  
Figure 3 shows the dispersion in our measure of bank health over the course of our 
sample. We portray only the data for March-on-March changes because most of the firms in our 
sample close their books in that month, and this keeps the figure less cluttered. The line indicates 
the log change in the median market-to-book value in our sample of main banks. As the figure 
shows, the typical bank saw its market value rise dramatically in the bubble years and fall 
sharply as nonperforming loans accumulated in the 1990s. The worst years for Japanese banks 
were 1990 (the year after land prices peaked in Tokyo), 1992 (as the first wave of bank failures 
began), 1997 (as Japan was wracked by another series of bank failures), and of course 2008 and 
2009 as the global banking crisis hit Japan.  
What is critical for our study, however, is the heterogeneity in the returns of different 
banks. In most years, the difference between the bank with the highest return and the bank with 
the lowest return was approximately one-half log unit, which suggests that, in the typical year, 
some banks had returns that were 69 percentage points higher than others. For example, while 
Mizuho Financial Group and Shinsei Bank, who were the 5
th and 8
th largest unsecured creditors 
to Lehman, saw their stock prices plunge by 42 and 60 percent respectively between the end of 
August and the end of December, Resona Holdings, with little exposure, saw its stock price rise 
by 7 percent over the same period. In other words, the real estate crash in the 1990s and global 
financial crisis in 2008-9 did not affect all banks equally, leading to enormous differences in 18 
 
bank performance. We will exploit this cross-bank variation in bank performance in our 
identification strategy. 
Table 1 presents sample statistics for our key variables. One of the most striking features 
of this table is the unimportance of trade finance relative to aggregate bank lending.  Less than 1 
percent of the typical bank’s lending is in the form of trade finance and no bank extends more 
than 9 percent of its credit in the form of trade finance. Given that the typical bank in our sample 
extends trade finance to over fifty firms in our sample (and many more firms that are not in our 
sample), the data strongly suggest that the export credit exposure of any bank to any particular 
exporter is likely to be quite small. Similarly, the lending exposure of any bank to an exporter is 
also quite small. The mean share of a bank’s total loans to an individual exporter is 0.01 percent, 
and no firm in our sample accounted for more than 0.6 percent of a bank’s loans. These data 
indicate that the exposure of banks in our sample to either movements in any individual firm’s 
trade finance borrowings or even aggregate borrowings was tiny.  
Although trade finance is a very small share of aggregate lending by our sample of banks, 
the volume of this lending is very closely tied to the health of these institutions. Leaving aside 
issues of causality for now, it is straightforward to show that when banks become unhealthy, they 
lend less. We demonstrate this by regressing the log of a bank’s total loans in a year on the log of 
its market-to-book ratio in the previous year as well as bank and year fixed effects. The results 
presented in table 2 are in line with those in Peek and Rosengren (1995) showing that banks 
whose health declines cut back on lending.  
In column 2 of table 2, we estimate an analogous equation using the log of foreign bills 
bought as the dependent variable.  The elasticity of foreign bills bought with respect to changes 
in bank health is three times larger than the elasticity of total lending. A one percent decline in a 19 
 
bank’s market value is associated with 0.46 percent decline in trade finance, but only a 0.14 
percent decline in aggregate lending. Similarly, column 3 shows that banks whose health 
declined saw dramatic drops in their trade finance lending relative to their domestic lending lines. 
One interpretation of this is that financially stressed Japanese banks could not easily raise money 
and therefore could not roll over short maturity financial instruments like foreign bills. 
Regardless of the interpretation, the results make clear that there is a positive correlation between 
the health of financial institutions and the amount of trade finance they supply.  Moreover, 
deteriorations in bank health are associated with much larger declines in the supply of trade 
finance than in other types of lending.   
Another important correlation we highlight is the strong link between trade finance 
provided by a bank and the exports of firms that identify that institution as a reference bank.  
One of the problems in conducting this analysis is that the number of exporters that are 
associated with a reference bank can change as firms enter or leave our sample or change banks. 
We therefore restricted the sample to the subset of exports conducted by a balanced panel of 
firms with March closing dates that were tied to a particular main bank over the full sample 
period, which eliminates about 30 percent of the firms in the full sample.  
In column 4, we aggregate the exports of these firms together by their main bank and 
regress the change in aggregate exports associated with a bank on the change in the bank’s 
foreign bills bought, as well as bank and year fixed effects. Here we see that exports are 
positively associated with that bank’s provision of trade finance. In order to make sure that these 
results are not driven by particular banks serving particular industries, we summed together the 
exports of firms that are clients of a particular bank in each industry and reran the regression 
with industry fixed effects. The results reported in column 5 of table 2 indicate that the exports of 20 
 
client firms within an industry are positively correlated with trade finance provision of their 
banks. While this does not establish causality, table 2 makes clear that there is a link between 
bank health and trade finance as well as between trade finance and exports.  
 
6.  Bank Health and Exports: Estimation 
 The links between bank health and trade finance as well as trade finance and exports beg 
the question of whether we can discern a direct effect of bank health on exports. Obviously, a 
large number of other factors are related to export growth. However, most of these – industry 
demand, factor endowments, exchange rates, and factor prices, for example – can be thought of 
as common to all exporters within an industry at a moment in time. We therefore include 
industry-year dummies in our specifications to eliminate any bias arising from these sources.
12 
Our basic estimating equation is:   
(1)   
where Exportsft corresponds to the exports of firm f at time t, INDfit is an indicator variable that is 
one if firm f is in industry i in time t, BANKfbt is an indicator variable that is one if the firm is a 
client of bank b in time t, MTBbt is the market-to-book value of bank b in time t, and all Greek 
symbols are parameters to be estimated. In other words, we will be estimating the impact of bank 
health on client exporters with a full set of bank and industry-time fixed effects. We include the 
γb’s to control for endogeneity problems that might arise because firms that have higher average 
export growth rates might match with banks whose market-to-book values tend to rise on 
average. Thus, the correlation between export growth and growth in the market-to-book value 
                                                 
12 The data divide manufacturing into over 100 sectors depending on the year, which comprise our industry 
dummies in the period 1987 to 1999. In the later period, the consolidated data use a different industry coding 
comprising 81 categories. All standard errors are clustered at the bank level. 
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might simply reflect the possibility that good exporters match with good banks rather than the 
year-to-year covariation in exports and bank health. Our identification strategy, then, is based on 
how the export growth of firms within a narrowly defined industry in a particular year varies 
with the health of the banks providing those firms with trade finance.  
Table 3 presents the results from these regressions. We drop firms whose export growth 
is in the top and bottom one percentile.
13 The first two columns present regressions of the change 
in log exports on the lag change in the log market-to-book value of the bank most likely to be 
supplying trade finance. In the first column, we report results with just year dummies, and in the 
second column, we report results with just industry-year fixed effects. In the third column we 
add bank fixed effects, so the regression corresponds exactly to the specification in equation (1). 
The estimated coefficient with industry-year and bank dummies is about 0.08, which means that 
when a firm’s bank suffers a 30 percent decline in its market-to-book value, the firm’s annual 
exports declined 2.7 percent relative to a firm whose bank’s health did not decline.  
In column 4 of table 3, we check whether we have the correct lag structure in the change 
in the market-to-book value. The results indicate that a change in the market-to-book value from, 
say, December 1996 to December 1997, will affect export growth from the calendar year 1997 to 
calendar year 1998. Thus, the fall in exports occurs in the year following the slump in bank 
health. Column 4 shows that a two-period lagged change in market-to-book value has no effect 
on exports.
14 All the effects appear to be contained within the year following the change in bank 
health. This implies that the effects of a decline in bank health are short term, as one would 
expect if a decline in bank health immediately led to a decline in the ability of the bank to raise 
financing.  
                                                 
13 Including these outliers tends to magnify the effect of bank health on exports. 
14 The contemporaneous change in market-to-book value is also insignificant. 22 
 
An important part of our argument supporting a link between the financial sector and 
exports is that exporters depend on trade finance to make sales abroad because of the greater 
risks associated with exporting coupled with the higher need for working-capital financing. In 
order to test whether we have identified an export-specific effect or merely a general effect 
applicable to all sales, we replaced the dependent variable with the log change in domestic sales 
for the same sample of firms in column 5 of table 3. This sample includes all firms that exported 
at any time during the sample period − in 10 percent of the observations domestic sales account 
for 100 percent of the firm’s total sales and the median share of domestic sales in total sales is 70 
percent.  As the table shows, firms whose main bank became unhealthy tend to sell less in the 
domestic market, but the effect is much smaller than the effect on exports.
15 The results in 
columns 3 and 5 indicate that the decline in the health of the bank providing trade finance causes 
exports to decline about 7 times more than domestic sales. This indicates that declines in bank 
health are associated not only with declines in the supply of trade finance to firms, but also with 
exports by client firms. In column 6, we replace the dependent variable with the log change in 
the ratio of exports to domestic sales. The results clearly show that the export to domestic sales 
ratios of firms fell after the health of banks supplying trade finance declined. This strongly 
suggests that these results are driven by the additional financing needs of exporting relative to 
selling domestically even within the same set of firms. 
One potential concern about this methodology is that there may be an endogeneity 
problem either through reverse causality, if export performance were driving bank performance, 
or through an omitted variable that might be affecting both bank health and a firm’s exports.  
Column 6 in table 3 suggests that it is highly unlikely that our results are being driven by reverse 
                                                 
15 We dropped observations where domestic sales growth is in the top and bottom one percentile. Including these 
outliers leads to an insignificant positive effect of bank health on domestic sales. 23 
 
causality as it seems hard to argue that the health of a bank is systematically related to changes in 
a borrower’s export to domestic sales ratio.  
Nevertheless, in table 4 we implement a number of additional robustness checks to show 
that endogeneity is not driving the results. One such possibility is that there may be some 
correlation between changes in exports and changes in a bank’s market-to-book value that we 
have not considered. For example, if changes in contemporaneous exports are correlated with 
changes in a bank’s market-to-book value and changes in exports are serially correlated, we 
might observe a spurious correlation. To check that persistence in export growth is not driving 
the results, we included a lagged dependent variable in column 1 of table 4 and show that the 
coefficient on the market-to-book value remains unchanged. This indicates that even if one 
believes in a contemporaneous correlation between a firm’s exports and a bank’s health, that 
correlation cannot be driving our results. Instead, a deterioration in bank health is leading to a 
future decline in exports that is independent of what is happening to contemporaneous export 
growth.  
In principle, it is possible that bank health may be correlated with other firm performance 
variables. Although we have argued that it is highly unlikely, we check that our results are robust 
to this possibility by following Klein, Peek, and Rosengren (2002) and include lagged firm 
performance measures other than exports in the second column. We include the one-period lag 
change in a firm’s log total assets and the lagged change in a firm’s profitability, measured as the 
ratio of net income to assets. The coefficient on total assets is positive and significant whereas 
the coefficient on profits is insignificant. Moreover, the point estimate on the change in the 
market-to-book value is unaffected by the inclusion of these measures of firm performance. 
Another omitted variable issue could arise if exposure to countries hit by the Asian crisis such as 24 
 
South Korea simultaneously affected a bank’s health and a firm’s exports. Similarly, one may 
worry that the 2008 financial crisis was driven by anticipated declines in Japanese export 
opportunities that also affected banks. To ensure this is not driving our results, we reestimate 
equation (1) for the pre-Asian crisis years up to 1996 – a period during which there was no major 
foreign downturn – so that our bank health shocks arise largely from the housing and loan crisis 
in Japan and see from column 3 that the estimates remain unchanged.  
A skeptic might still worry that a client firm’s health might affect both its ability to 
export and the health of the bank providing it with credit. We have already seen from the 
summary statistics that our sample of banks only had trivial levels of loan exposure to the firms 
in this sample, so it is unlikely that movements in client borrowing would dramatically affect a 
bank’s profits. However, one could imagine a correlation arising from a number of different 
sources. For example, future exports might be correlated with the probability of a firm loan 
default and hence bankruptcy.
16 Alternatively, since banks may own up to 5 percent of a firm’s 
shares in Japan, it may be the case that the bank’s share price is correlated with the firm’s share 
price. In order to make sure that there is no reverse causality arising from the health of the firm 
affecting the health of the bank, we use the residuals from a regression of changes in bank 
market-to-book values on firm share price changes (with industry-time dummies) as an 
instrument.
17 These residuals are uncorrelated with the health of the firm or its expected profits 
by construction, and we relegate the proof of the validity of this instrument to an appendix. The 
strong fit of the first stage indicates that changes in bank health are largely driven by forces 
                                                 
16 If a decline in exports is associated with a greater probability of bankruptcy, a bank’s share price might decline 
when a firm’s exports decline. However, the bankruptcy rate of listed companies was extremely low during this 
period, less than 0.1 percent per year over our sample period (see Xu and Zhang (2009)). This, coupled with the fact 
that these banks had very little loan exposure to any firm in the sample, suggests that it is highly unlikely that 
defaults by exporters, in general the most profitable firms in the market, should be driving our results. 
17 We used change in firm share price instead of change in firm market-to-book value, because the DBJ data did not 
report the number of shares issued of each firm. In practice, these two measures are very highly correlated.  25 
 
unconnected with the health of their exporting clients, so while one might worry about 
theoretical correlations, in reality the driving forces behind Japan’s financial crises had nothing 
to do with the health of exporters. As one can see in column 4 of table 4, using these residuals as 
an instrument hardly affects the impact of bank health on firm exports. In other words, the health 
of the bank has an impact on the firm’s exports that is independent of the firm’s health.
18 In 
column 5, we replace the dependent variable with the log change in the ratio of exports to 
domestic sales and use the same instrument. Again, we see that the instrumental variable 
estimation produces almost the same results as the OLS estimate.  
 
7.  Robustness 
In table 5, we show that the results are robust to alternative bank-matching methods and 
to different measures of bank health. Other researchers have used the bank providing the largest 
loan to a firm as the means of identifying the main bank. In order to examine the sensitivity of 
the results to our method of matching firms and banks, we identified the main bank as the largest 
lender to the firm among “city banks,” that is, commercial banks. Because Japanese city banks 
are known to be involved in trade finance, firms that borrow heavily from city banks are likely to 
obtain trade finance from them as well. In the first column of table 5, we identify the main bank 
as the city bank providing the largest loan to each exporter.
19 Then, in column 2 of table 5, we 
rerun the regression identifying the trade finance bank as any first-listed reference bank in the 
Japan Company Handbook, even if it is a regional bank, expanding the early sample of banks 
                                                 
18 Similarly, including the exporter’s share price as an independent variable in equation 1 does not qualitatively 
affect the bank health coefficient.  
19 The matched bank-firm lending data is unavailable for the latter period thus this robustness check only includes 
the sample from 1987 to 1999. In the earlier sample, firms sometimes did not report the sources of their loans in 
some years. If there was no loan listed in a year, we used the main bank in the previous year. If there were no loans 
over the whole sample period, we dropped the firm from the estimation in this column.  26 
 
from 15 to 43 and in later years from 5 to 28. The results are not qualitatively different from 
those in our baseline specification, indicating that other reasonable methods of identifying which 
bank handles most of the firm’s trade finance transactions seem to yield similar results.  
Our measure of bank health relies on share and equity values in the closing month of each 
accounting year. To address concerns that a particular month may be atypical, we define the 
market-to-book value in column 3 of table 5 as the average of the market-to-book value in the 
last three months of each accounting period, to smooth out any unusual fluctuations. We see that 
the results are robust to this alternative definition.  
Another potential problem is that we use the same industry-year dummies for firms 
whose accounting years end in different months. This could potentially cause problems because 
not all the months fall within the same 12-month period. To make sure this variation is not 
causing a problem, we reestimated the baseline equation with only those observations in which 
the accounting year ends in March, and again we see that the results are robust (see column 4, 
table 5).  
If trade finance does matter for the response of exporters to financial shocks, then one 
should expect to see certain kinds of firm heterogeneity in the data in which some firms at some 
times are more affected than other firms. First, it is probably much harder for a firm to find 
alternative forms of trade finance when a bank runs into trouble in a crisis period and many other 
institutions are troubled than if only the firm’s bank is in trouble.
20 In order to test for this effect, 
                                                 
20 Obviously, if firms can easily switch between sources of trade finance, problems in one financial institution need 
not create difficulties for an exporter. However, there is good reason to believe that it is difficult to find another 
source of financing quickly in the event that an exporter is cut off. In particular, any new financial institution 
interested in providing trade finance would need to examine carefully the risk of the exporter, the importer, the 
purchaser’s financial institutions, and the reasons why the original financier refused credit. While this analysis can 
certainly be done, it may take some time and is likely to delay the exports. Moreover, it may be hard to find a new 
source of trade finance in the midst of a financial crisis when many institutions are under stress. Thus, the mere fact 
that exporters can find alternative sources of finance does not mean that they can do so rapidly enough to prevent an 
interruption in their shipments. 27 
 
we interacted the change in the bank’s market to book value with a dummy that equals 1 for the 
crisis years: 1990 (the year bank share prices started to fall), 1992 (the year the jusen (Japan’s 
specialized housing and loan companies) losses were tied to the banks), 1997 (the year many 
Japanese banks began failing), and 2008 and 2009. As one can see from column 1 of table 6, the 
effect that we identify is particularly strong during banking crises. In other words, although bank 
health always matters, it matters much more for exports during financial crisis than when banks 
are healthy in general. This may reflect the difficulty of finding alternative sources of funding in 
the middle of a financial crisis. 
A second concern might be that the lessons from earlier Japanese crises might not be 
applicable to the current crisis either because the epicenter of the crisis was abroad or because of 
the global demand shocks hitting the Japanese economy. In order to test if the “Lehman Shock” 
was different, we reran our estimation using only data from 2007. The coefficient estimates 
reported in column 2 of table 6 are quite similar to what we observed earlier. Clients of banks 
that became unhealthy exported less than those of healthier institutions.  
Thus far, we have been arguing that there are two principle reasons why firms use trade 
finance: international trade takes longer than domestic trade and international trade involves 
greater risk. We now turn to investigating these two links. Since Japan is an island, Japanese 
firms export goods either by air or sea. Since goods shipped by air arrive at their destinations 
much more rapidly than goods shipped by sea, one should expect that working capital 
considerations to be larger for firms shipping goods by sea relative to those exporting by air. 
Since we do not know the mode of transport of each firm’s exports, we relied on the firm’s 28 
 
sector.
21  We generated an air dummy variable that equaled one if a firm was in a sector in which 
more than 50 percent of the value of exports was shipped by air. In column 3 of table 6, we 
interact that dummy with our bank health measure. The results indicate that changes in bank 
health matter a lot for firms in industries in which goods are predominantly shipped by sea but 
not for firms in industries in which goods are shipped by air. The different effects for air and sea 
shipping are consistent with the notion that firms whose goods are shipped more rapidly have 
lower working capital needs than firms whose goods remain in transit longer.  
We next investigate the role played by default risk. When firms export to foreign 
affiliates, they do not face a default risk and therefore one should expect their trade finance needs 
to be less. Since approximately half of the firms in our sample have foreign affiliates, we split 
the sample according to whether a firm has foreign affiliates and re-estimate our basic equation. 
In columns 4 and 5 of table 6, we show that exporters that transact with foreign affiliates (and 
therefore face no default risk on these transactions) do not experience export declines when their 
banks run into trouble. However, there are powerful effects for firms engaged exclusively in 
arms length transactions, presumably because they need the risk insurance provided by their 
financial institutions. These results indicate that trade finance matters principally for firms whose 
goods remain in transit for long periods and face trade credit default risk.  
In table 7, we address various sources of possible selection biases. One possible concern 
is that firms with higher export growth might switch to healthier banks. This is unlikely to be a 
problem in our data because bank relationships tend to be extremely stable over time (Aoki, 
Patrick, and Sheard (1994), Yafeh (1995), and Hoshi and Kashyap (2001)). In order to show this 
in our data, we define “switchers” as firms that change their main banks when not forced by a 
                                                 
21 Data on Japanese exports by mode of transport are from the Japanese Ministry of Finance website 
(http://www.customs.go.jp/toukei/info/tsdl_e.htm), and matched this with the industry definitions in the DBJ 
database.  29 
 
bank merger. The mergers between 2000 and 2005 dramatically reduced the number of Japanese 
banks resulting in only 1 percent of firms switching banks between 2007 and 2010, but even in 
the earlier period only 8 percent of our sample of firms changed main banks between 1987 and 
1999. Nevertheless, to make sure that those few firms that changed main banks were not driving 
our results, we kept the bank dummies in the specification to control for each bank’s unobserved 
health at the start of the sample and restricted our sample of firms to those that stayed with the 
same main bank throughout the sample period. We report the results from this exercise in 
column 1 of table 7. The results are unchanged from those with the full sample, indicating that 
whatever selection process is at work to link firms and banks, it is not driving our results.  
Another selection issue arises from the fact that, by measuring bank health as the change 
in the log market-to-book value, we have no measure of bank health when banks fail and their 
share price goes to zero. This may be desirable because it is not clear that market-to-book values 
are relevant if banks are nationalized. To test whether our results are sensitive to this sample 
selection, however, we replaced our measure of bank health with the percentage change in 
market-to-book value. This measure is bounded below at -1 when a bank’s share price goes to 
zero. The results in column 2 of table 7 are almost identical to those in our main specification, 
indicating that the inclusion or exclusion of bank failures does not qualitatively affect our 
conclusions. 
A final possible selection issue arises from firms that enter or exit the export market. 
Again, we have several reasons to believe, ex ante, that this factor will not be important for 
understanding our results. First, since the firms in our sample are all listed, they tend to be larger 
than the typical firm, and hence there is much less entry and exit than in samples drawn from 
census data. Second, it is hard to imagine that the inability to obtain short-term export financing 30 
 
from a particular bank would be a reason for a firm to alter a long-term decision about whether 
to enter an export market. Third, the inability of a firm to obtain export financing from a 
particular bank at a moment in time might cause a firm to lose some contracts, but it is unlikely 
that it would cause the firm to make the long-term decision to exit the export market altogether. 
These arguments notwithstanding, we checked to see if our results were robust to the 
possibility that trade finance affected entry and exit by estimating a two-stage Heckman 
correction. We model the probability of exporting as being related to the firm’s productivity 
since high productivity is likely to induce entry and low productivity is likely to induce exit (see 
Melitz (2003)) whereas the level of productivity is unlikely to affect the growth in exports. We 
measure the productivity of the firm by using the firm’s value added per worker relative to the 
industry maximum each year, where the industry is defined at the three-digit level, comprising 
52 industries.
22 We also include the log change in the market-to-book value of its main bank, 
year dummies to account for macro shocks, and bank fixed effects in the probit. The results of 
this selection equation (see the bottom of column 3 in table 7) indicate that the probability of 
exporting rises with productivity as one would expect. The point estimate for the coefficient on 
the change in the bank’s market-to-book ratio in column 3, however, is almost identical to that in 
column 3 of table 3. Thus, selection into and out of exporting does not seem to be biasing our 
results. Another way to see whether selection effects due to exit might be affecting our results is 
to redefine the dependent variable as the percentage change in exports instead of the log change, 
thus including the firms that exit from exporting. Of course, this truncates the dependent variable 
in the left distribution at -1. We therefore estimate the equation using a Tobit procedure in 
                                                 
22 We did not define the maximum productivity at the more disaggregated four-digit level because in many years 
and many industries there would be only one exporting firm, leading to a relative productivity measure equal to 1. 
Value added per worker data was unavailable for the consolidated exporters in the later period.  31 
 
column 4 with the full sample using random effects at the industry level. Again, we see that the 
coefficient on the lagged market to book value is hardly affected. 
 
8.  Economic Significance 
Thus far, we have been largely concerned with the statistical significance and robustness 
of our results, but we have given scant attention to the economic significance. Our results can be 
thought of as the partial effect of a financial shock to banks on exports through the trade finance 
channel. Nevertheless, it is useful to get a sense of the magnitudes of our estimated changes 
relative to the aggregate changes in exports. As figure 2 illustrates, the banking crisis of 2008-9 
coincided with a substantial decline in Japanese exports. The median market-to-book ratio for 
our sample of Japanese banks fell 0.53 log units between March of 2007 and March of 2008 and 
another 0.76 log units between March of 2008 and March of 2009. Those declines were followed 
by very sharp drops in Japanese exports. Japanese exports fell 18 percent in FY2008 (which 
ended in March of 2009) and 19 percent in FY 2009. If we multiply the log change in median 
bank’s market-to-book values by the estimated impact of bank health in column 4 of table 4, 
gives us an implied reduction in exports due to financial shocks of 4 percent in the early period 
and 6 percent – about one-quarter of the aggregate drop in exports. Although macroeconomic 
factors obviously played an important role as well, our results indicate that the partial effect of 
trade finance on exports identified in this paper are quantitatively large even relative to the 
aggregate decline.  
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9.  Conclusion 
  Traditional macro and trade models have not been able to explain why exports fall so 
much faster than domestic output during financial crises. This has created a puzzle regarding 
why exports might respond to financial crises differently than domestic output. We address this 
question by first providing a number of arguments explaining why one might expect exports to 
be more sensitive to financial sector shocks than domestic sales. In particular, the greater credit 
default risks and longer time lags associated with international trade make exporters more 
dependent on financing for their exports than for their domestic sales.  
The main contribution of our paper is that we test these hypotheses using matched bank-
firm data that enable us to identify the transmission mechanism from the banks that supply firms 
with trade finance to the export behavior of those firms, thus overcoming the measurement and 
endogeneity issues that have plagued previous studies. Our paper is the first to establish a causal 
link from shocks in the financial sector to exporters that result in exports declining much faster 
than output during banking crises. Moreover, we show that these effects are smaller for 
multinationals and firms that export mostly by air, which is precisely the type of heterogeneity 
that one would expect if trade finance were driving the results.  
Finally, we also demonstrate that the drops in exports due to financial factors are 
quantitatively large relative to the aggregate drops in Japanese exports in crisis years. Since the 
evidence indicates that exporters in many countries are highly dependent on trade finance, these 
results suggest that financial shocks are likely to play important roles in export declines in other 
countries as well.  
Our results have a number of implications for future research. First, they point to 
important links between the often separate fields of international trade and international finance. 33 
 
In addition, the important connections between exporters and their financiers may have particular 
relevance for countries that often suffer from financial crises. For example, the differences in the 
behavior of multinationals and air vs. sea shippers may ultimately help us to understand why 
some countries experienced much steeper declines in their exports than others. Finally, our 
estimates also provide strong support for an international financial accelerator that helps explain 
how financial shocks affect the real sector and are propagated internationally. 
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Figure 1  
Quarterly Movements in the Ratio of World Exports to GDP, 1995–2009 
 
Source: This figure was constructed using national sources: Australia, Australian Bureau of 
Statistics; Belgium, the Banque Nationale de Belgique; Canada, Statistics Canada; France, 
National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies; Germany, Deutsche Bundesbank; Hong 
Kong, Hong Kong Census and Statistics Department; Italy, Istituto Nazionale di Statistica; Japan, 
Cabinet Office; Netherlands, Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek; Norway, Statistik Sentralbyra; 
Spain, Instituto Nacional de Estadistica; Sweden, Statistiska Centralbyran; Switzerland, State 
Secretariat for Economic Affairs; Taiwan, Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and 
Statistics; United Kingdom, Office of National Statistics; and United States, Bureau of Economic 
Analysis. 
 



























Firm-Level and Aggregate Export Growth in Japan, 1987–2009 
 
Source: Firm-level data is from the Development Bank of Japan database of unconsolidated corporate 
reports. The aggregate official export data for each fiscal year was downloaded from the Japanese 
Ministry of Finance (http://www.customs.go.jp/toukei/suii/html/time_e.htm).  
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Figure 3  
Change in the Market-to-Book Value of Japanese Banks, 1986–2009 
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 ﾠBanks	 ﾠ Median	 ﾠBanks	 ﾠ40 
 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Notes: Profits are defined as the ratio of after-tax net income to total assets. 
    
By banks  N  mean  median  sd  min  max 
ln(foreign bills bought)b,t  200  12.017  12.330  1.131  5.011  13.661 
Δln(foreign bills bought)b,t  200  -0.071  -0.076  0.189  -0.555  0.483 
ln(totloans)b,t  200  16.745  16.817  0.613  15.298  18.117 
(foreign bills/totloans)b,t  200  0.013  0.009  0.013  0.000  0.088 
ln(foreign bills/totloans)bt  200  -4.728  -4.689  0.972  -10.447  -2.426 
 ln(market-to-book value)b,t-1  200  1.296  1.348  0.551  -0.426  2.612 
Δln(market-to-book value)b,t-1  182  -0.034  -0.105  0.311  -0.844  1.050 
By firms             
 Number of firmst  8,679  661  644  78  539  858 
Δln(exports)ft  8,679  -0.009  0.009  0.254  -1.232  0.949 
Δln(domestic sales)ft  8,553  -0.012  0.002  0.128  -0.825  0.378 
Δln(exports/domestic sales)ft  8,553  0.005  0.014  0.255  -1.348  1.189 
Δln(market-to-value)f,t-1  8,679  -0.160  -0.151  0.339  -1.261  1.112 
Δln(assets)f,t-1  8,415  0.025  0.019  0.109  -1.027  1.000 
 Δ(profits)f,t-1  8,292  -0.004  -0.001  0.026  -0.162  0.118 
Δln(share price)f,t-1  8,289  -0.064  -0.051  0.287  -0.870  0.730 
Total loanfbt/Total loanbt  5,523  0.0001  0.00004  0.0002  0  0.006 41 
 








Δln(exports)b,t  Δln(exports)bi,t 
        By bank  By 
bank/industry 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
           
ln(market-to-  0.143***  0.457***  0.313**     
book value)b,t-1  (0.054)  (0.142)  (0.137)     
           
Δln(trade finance        0.143***  0.087*** 
loan)b,t        (0.057)  (0.018) 
           
Fixed effects:           
Year  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Bank  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry  No  No  No  No  Yes 
           
           
Observations  197  197  197  164  3,043 
Adjusted R
2  0.96  0.96  0.82  0.32  0.20 
 
Notes:  Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***Significant at the 1 percent level. **Significant at the 5 
percent level. Columns 1 to 3 include the 15 city banks  in our sample: Asahi Bank, Bank of Tokyo, Bank of Tokyo 
Mitsubishi, The Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank, The Daiwa Bank,The Fuji Bank, Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, Industrial 
Bank of Japan, Long Term Credit Bank of Japan, Saitama Bank, Sakura Bank, The Sanwa Bank, Sumitomo Bank, 
Taiyo-Kobe Bank, and The Tokai Bank. In the later period the city banks comprise Mizuho Financial Group, MUFJ 
Financial Group, Sumitomo-Mitsui Financial Group, Resona Holdings, and Shinsei. Column 4 aggregates firm-level 
exports by first reference bank. Column 5 aggregates firm-level exports by first reference bank within an industry. In 
columns 4 and 5, we drop the first year that a bank mergers to avoid big jumps in exports due to mergers, we drop 
any firm that switches their main bank and we keep the sample balanced so it only includes firms that were in the 
sample for the whole sample period.  
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  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
        Lag MTB     
             
Δln(market-to-  0.068***  0.073***  0.080***  0.081***  0.012*  0.072*** 
book value)f,t-1  (0.013)  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.017)  (0.007)  (0.019) 
             
Δln(market-to-         0.008     
book value)f,t-2          (0.023)     
             
             
Fixed effects:             
Year-industry  no  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Year  yes  no  no  no  no  no 
Bank  no  no  yes  yes  yes  yes 
             
             
Observations  8,679  8,679  8,679  8,417  9,755  8,553 
Adjusted R
2  0.11  0.19   0.19  0.18  0.45  0.12 
 
Notes:  Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the bank level are in parentheses. ***Significant at the 1 
percent level. **Significant at the 5 percent level. We use 108 industry codes in the first period corresponding to the 
DBJ industry classification scheme and 81 codes in the latter period corresponding to the Nikkei system. In column 
3 and all subsequent columns, the industry dummies are multiplied by each year dummy.  
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Table 4: Endogeneity 
 
Dependent variable  Δln(exports)f,t  Δln(exports/ 
domestic sales)f,t 

















for firms’ share prices 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
           
Δln(market-to-  0.079***  0.080***  0.076***  0.073***  0.068*** 
book value)f,t-1  (0.018)  (0.019)  (0.029)  (0.016)  (0.019) 
           
Δln(exports)f,t-1  -0.052***         
  (0.016)         
           
Δln(assets)f,t-1    0.264***       
    (0.037)       
           
Δ(profits)f,t-1    -0.072       
    (0.187)       
           
Fixed effects:           
Year-industry   yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
Bank  yes  yes  yes  yes  yes 
           
First-stage:           
           
Δln(adjusted market-to-book      1.000***  1.000*** 
value)f,t-1      (0.001)  (0.001) 
           
F-stat        1.5e+06  1.40e+06 
           
Observations  8,308  8,292  5,313  8,289  8,171 
Adjusted R
2  0.19  0.20  0.15     
 
Notes:  Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the bank level are in parentheses. ***Significant at the 1 
percent level. **Significant at the 5 percent level. Profits are defined as the ratio of after-tax net income to total 
assets. The instrument in columns 4 and 5 is the residual from a regression of the change in the bank’s market-to-
book value on the change in the firm’s share price.  
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Table 5: Alternative Measures of Main Bank and Market Timing 
 
Dependent Variable: Δln(exports)f,t 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Alternative bank matching  MTB value:  March  
  Loans  All banks  3 months average  accounting period 
  	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Δln(market-to-         0.072***        0.067***        0.056***        0.049** 
book value)f,t-1  (0.016)  (0.014)  (0.019)  (0.022) 
         
Fixed effects:         
Year-Industry   yes  yes  yes  yes 
Bank  yes  yes  yes  yes 
         
Observations  6,702  8,702  8,592  7,441 
Adjusted R
2  0.13  0.19  0.19  0.20 
 
Notes:  Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the bank level are in parentheses. ***Significant at the 1 
percent level. **Significant at the 5 percent level. In column 1, we use an alternative method for matching firms to 
banks:  we assign a city bank that was the largest loan provider that year. If the exporter had no loans from a city 
bank that year, we assign the previous year’s city bank. Note that this data was unavailable for the consolidated 
firms in the later period. In column 2, we use the first listed reference bank from the company handbooks, even if 
the first reference bank is not a city bank. In column 3, we define the market-to-book value as the average of the last 
three months of the accounting period. In column 4, we only keep observations where the accounting period ended 
in March. 
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Table 6: Heterogeneous Effects 
 
Dependent variable: Δln(exports)f,t 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
  Crisis 
interaction 
Subsample 










           
Δln(market-to-  0.049**  0.091***  0.105***  0.010  0.105*** 
book value)f,t-1  (0.025)  (0.034)  (0.021)  (0.022)  (0.033) 
           
RZi*Δln(market-to-            
book value)f,t-1           





       
book value)f,t-1  (0.033)         
           
Air*Δln(market-      -0.126***     
to-book value)f,t-1      (0.040)     
           
Fixed effects:           
Year-industry  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Bank  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
           
           
Observations  8,679  1,619  5,202  3,389  3,671 
Adjusted R
2  0.19  0.28  0.14  0.18  0.12 
 
Notes:  Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the bank level are in parentheses. ***Significant at the 1 
percent level. **Significant at the 5 percent level. *Significant t the 10 percent level. Crisis dummy equals 1 for years 
1990, 1992, 1997, 2008, 2009. In column 3, the air dummy is defined as equal one if the share of trade exported by air 
is greater than 50 percent within that industry. Miscellaneous industries were dropped because of concordance 
difficulties. The concordance required to match the industrial data to the air/shipping data was only available for the 
earlier period. Similarly, information on foreign affiliates was unavailable for the consolidated data in the later period. 
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Δln(exports)f,t  Percentage 
change in 
exports 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 








    in MTB value     
  	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Δln(market-to-     0.076***        0.067***     0.088***  0.077*** 
book value)f,t-1  (0.016)  (0.018)  (0.019)  (0.020) 
         
Fixed effects:         
Year-Industry   yes  yes  yes  no 
Bank    yes  yes  yes  yes 
year  no  no  no  yes 
First stage         
         
Relative value       0.353***   
added per workerf,t-1      (0.068)   
         
Δln(market-to-       -0.040   
book value)f,t-1      (0.108)   
         
Fixed effects:         
Year       yes   
Bank        yes   
         
Inverse mills ratio      -2.018***   
      (0.587)   
         
Observations  8,055  8,686  8,357  8,851 
R-squared  0.19  0.19    0.17 
Notes:  Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the bank level are in parentheses. ***Significant at the 1 
percent level. **Significant at the 5 percent level. In column 2, we drop any firm that switches its main bank during 
the sample period.  In column 3, the selection is a function of relative value added (relative to three-digit industry by 
year), the change in market-to- book value, year effects, and bank effects. There are 1,297 censored observations 
and 7,060 uncensored observations in column 3. The random effects in the Tobit specification are at the industry 
level, and there are 172 left-censored observations. 
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Appendix 
Validity of Instrumental Variables Approach 
To keep the notation simple, we’ll suppress all of the exogenous variables and firm and bank 
subscripts. Suppose that we can write the log change in exports,  as: 
(A1)  , 
where ΔS is the change in firm health, Z is a set of exogenous variables that affect exports, Greek 
letters are parameters to be estimated, and ξ is an error term. We next postulate that the change in 
bank health ΔM is correlated with the change in firm health, so that we can write: 
(A2)  . 
We assume that the η and ξ are uncorrelated, so that the only reason that exports and bank health 
are correlated (after controlling for all the variables in equation A1) is that they both are 
correlated with firm health.  
Clearly η will be correlated with ΔM if that bank and firm health are not perfectly 
correlated. This establishes the residual from a regression of bank health on firm health as a 
potential instrument. The next step is to establish the instrument’s validity. We can rewrite 
equation (A2) as 
(A3)   
and equation (A1) as 
(A3)   
or 
(A4)    
 
In order to test the validity of our instrument we need to demonstrate that our estimate of 
α/β will equal zero under the hypothesis that bank health does not independently affect exports. 
If we use instrumental variables in order to obtain an estimate of the coefficient on bank health, 
the probability limit of the coefficient can be written as 
ΔE
ΔE =αΔS +θZ +ξ
ΔM = βΔS + λZ +η
ΔS =
ΔM − λZ −η
β
ΔE =



























cov !,'E ( )
cov !,'M ( )
 
By (A2), the denominator of this expression can be written as var(η). By (A1) and (A2) the 
numerator can be written as cov (η, ξ) =0, which establishes the validity of the instrument.  